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Introduction 
 
Warfare has changed. So too has defence logistics. Concepts of operation up until 
the end of the Cold War were, for countries such as the United Kingdom whose 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was a key component of NATO’s Central Front, 
based upon long lines of communication back to the Home Base (supply chains) that 
relied upon large stockholdings held at strategic locations in the unlikely event they 
were needed, in this case, to counter a Warsaw Pact incursion into West Germany.1 
 
However since then, the UK has seen a proliferation of ‘small’ wars across the globe 
where operations have been predicated upon expeditionary warfare – in other words, 
the forces have had to go to the operation (outside or on the fringes of Europe) 
rather than have the operation come to them with considerable implications for 
logistic strategy and infrastructure, as well as force deployment, utilisation and 
recovery. Such operations have occurred at a time when public finances have been 
under scrutiny, no more so than during the current recession. There has been a 
growing need to ensure that such operations (be they warfighting, peace keeping or 
humanitarian relief) are successful despite the pressure on the defence budget, 
which until very recently had been dropping as a percentage of GDP across Europe 
since the end of the Cold War.2 
 
As the UK has changed its position in terms of the orientation of defence, so the 
potential to utilise Contractors of Deployed Operations (CONDO) has grown. Whilst 
in many ways this is not a new phenomenon, it does present issues and challenges 
that must be addressed if operational and financial imperatives are to be met. 
 
Understanding the Past 
 
Military Context 
 
Throughout military history, it has been the competent commander that has 
recognised the importance of logistics to a campaign or operation. Logistics is not 
just about the amassing and storage of fuel, supplies and equipment, but also the 
timely and balanced arrival of those resources to the forces that require them. An 
army’s logistic system is its link with the home industrial base and has been 
described as “the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to its warfighting forces”.3 
However, it has been the grand armoured thrust, the daring commando raid and the 
massed strategic air offensive that has always captured the public’s imagination. The 
harrowing trek of a convoy of supply trucks, the desperate strategic airlift of food and 
medical supplies or the long awaited arrival of the cargo ship with ammunition and 
fuel rarely do. “Finally, I have no reason to believe that logistics will ever have much 
military sex-appeal, except to serious soldiers, but this book is written in the hope 
that I am wrong.”4 
 
As alluded to above, the UK had after the Second World War, gradually moved away 
from policing its Empire to concentrating upon its role within NATO. The logistic 
implications of a clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have been 
enormous.  Despite its “economic weakness and commercial and industrial 
inefficiency, the Soviet Union possessed mighty and highly competent armed forces.  
Indeed, they were probably one of the few efficient parts of the Soviet Union.”5 In 
addition, NATO had a number of drawbacks, the most serious of which was its lack 
of sustainability. In a major shooting war, so long as the Soviets performed 
reasonably well, NATO would probably have lost due to the fact it would have run 
out of things with which to fight.6 
 
Commercial Context 
 
Just as the world of defence logistics was changing so too was the context for 
commercial logistics. Traditional methods of manufacture, procurement, storage and 
distribution were being challenged as organisations recognised that costs could be 
reduced by the integration of these activities and a new approach to the way that 
logistics was undertaken. Concepts and approaches such as Just-In-Time and Total 
Quality Management brought about a rethinking in the manner that logistics was 
undertaken. Whilst still founded upon transport and storage, the wider implications of 
the management of the supply chain as a whole, came to the fore in contemporary 
thinking.7 
 
The commercial world has long accepted that in order to gain competitive advantage 
it can reduce costs and enhance operational performance by outsourcing some of its 
activities to other organisations. The success of companies such as Toyota has been 
built upon a careful consideration of what can be achieved by in-house activities and 
those that can be best sourced from external contractors. This approach brought 
success to many commercial organisations during the 1980s and 1990s and its 
general concepts, put forward by academic writers such Ellram8, were adapted by 
Public Sector organisations and were generally seen as highly successful.9 Included 
in this category, could be Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) under the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), which are only now being re-examined to see if they have 
truly brought increased value for taxpayers money.10 
 
Nevertheless, the general concept of outsourcing has gained an impetus which is 
now hard to stop. Indeed, it is now an integral part of the logistics strategy to support 
the UK Armed Forces. 
 
For many Public Sector organisations such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the 
outsourcing of certain activities, especially those taking place in a benign 
environment, while initially contentious have in the main, proved to be successful. 
These would include catering, cleaning, IT support and guard services. More 
recently, these have been considered as a package where outsourcing has taken 
place to a third party facilities provider, such as Serco and ESS.11 Whilst success 
can be demonstrated in such benign environments, there has also been a move 
towards outsourcing of activities that are much closer to the frontline. One can see 
that such activities have taken place across a spectrum of operations (see diagram 
below12), with more and more activity expected to take place towards the right-hand 
end of the scale.13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even a cursory glance at the history of contractor involvement in military campaigns 
will highlight that they have been utilised to ensure the efficacy of logistic support to 
deployed forces. Such support was utilised in conflicts such as the Wars of the 
Spanish Succession (in the age of Marlborough), the Napoleonic Wars and the 
Crimean War for there "were Master Generals and Boards of Ordnance before there 
were Secretaries for War or Commanders-in-Chiefs".14 It was only really in the 
Twentieth Century that militaries moved away from this model towards one of self-
sufficiency, leading one to conclude that the wheel has indeed now turned full circle, 
as shown in this diagram:15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If indeed we accept that the military is moving back to what could be described as a 
'core competence' model of operations16, in order to continue to utilise contractors on 
deployed operations to best advantage, one must understand the issues and 
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Figure 1. The Spectrum of Conflict 
challenges that are presented to both the procuring and supplying organisations. 
These include: 
 
• Manpower Limits – many Western armed forces, including the UK, have limits to 
the number of troops they can deploy on operations. In many cases, this is down 
to the physical size of the armed forces and the other commitments they have to 
meet, but can also be down to limits imposed by the Legislature. For example, 
Germany has limits on the number of troops that can be deployed in 
Afghanistan, as set by the Bundestag, a limit that was upped in early 2011 to 
include an additional 300 air force personnel.17 If a country is close to the 
number of troops it can comfortably deploy on an operation, but needs to 
increase it combat capability, one option would be to withdraw support troops 
and replace them with contractors allowing additional combat troops to be 
deployed. This however would increase the ratio of contractors to service 
personnel, with all the potential problems that entails. 
• Private Security – The vast majority of contractors deployed at the moment offer 
logistical support to the forces that are deployed, however, a small but growing 
number of contractors are from Private Security Companies (PSCs) providing 
armed security according to the wishes of their client. While they do provide 
certain benefits (such as protection when military forces are unavailable and they 
are lower key in appearance), problems have arisen with wide variations in 
national and international legislation, the understanding and enforcement of 
existing laws and the pursuit of accountability as well as the highly publicised 
problems of governmental oversight over both contractors in general, and 
security contractors in particular.18 
• Protection – Given that contractors in general are reliant on the military for their 
protection, the proliferation of modern weapon systems with extended ranges 
and the tendency for current conflicts to be 'counter-insurgency' in nature (where 
there are no real 'frontlines'), are there really safe and benign 'rear areas' for 
contractor activity?19 It is also worth noting that contractor casualties go largely 
unreported and disguise the real human cost of war. For example in Afghanistan, 
by the beginning of 2010, the US had lost 848 troops and 289 contractors20, 
while there had been over 500 killed supporting UK forces in Operations Telic 
and Herrick since 2003.21 
• Risk – with the increasing shift by Western armed forces towards the core 
competency model and the increasingly greater role of contractors in most areas 
outside of direct warfighting, there is an increasing risk of a failure by a 
contractor to fulfil (for whatever reason) their obligations having a damaging, if 
not catastrophic impact on the conduct of operations, possibly leading to loss of 
life. This is hampered by the fact that military commanders cannot exert the 
same level of command and control as they can over troops under their 
command.22 
• Knowledge and Skill Sets – With contractors taking over more and more areas of 
support, the MoD has been in danger of not only allowing them to conduct the 
task but also to carry out the thinking and decision-making behind it, especially 
when it comes down to checking whether the contracted support has been a 
success and value for money. If there are few (or no) personnel who have the 
qualifications, core skill sets and experience in the areas that have been 
contracted out, there might be consequences to the MoD's culture, ethos, 
professionalism and institutional knowledge. In addition, how is the MoD to judge 
whether taxpayers' money has been well spent? One example of this was the 
report by Charles Haddon-Cave into the Nimrod crash over Iraq in 200623, which 
concluded that outsourcing can be expensive, involve inaccurate fixed costs, 
irreversible, time-consuming and lead to disastrous circumstances. 
• Local Contractors – While their use can help kick start the local economy, there 
is also a risk of dependency as foreign forces pay relatively well and provide 
opportunities that may not exist when the economy returns to normal. There's 
also the security question (for example, the risk of infiltrators) and what will 
happen to them once the foreign forces leave. 
• Psychological Problems – Given the increasing occurrences of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) in regular soldiers, it is only logical that the increased 
use of contractors and indeed Reservists (under the 'Total Support Force' 
concept24) will expose them to an increased risk of developing psychological 
disorders, with which there are fewer systems in place to ease the transition 
back to civilian life after the operation.25 
 
The use of contractors still posses challenges for the operational commander, MoD 
and the defence industry but given that the use of contractors on deployed 
operations can only grow in this age of austerity, it is a three-way relationship that 
needs to be managed effectively, if support to the UK Armed Forces is to be kept 
optimal in the coming years. 
 
                                                          
1
 Moore D. M. & Antill, P. D. (2000) ‘British Army Logistics and Contractors on the Battlefield’, RUSI Journal, 
October 2000, p. 46. 
2
 International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2011) The Military Balance 2011, London: Routledge, p. 79. 
3
 White, M. S. (1996) ‘How Can we Meet the Logistic Requirements of Forces Deployed at Some Distance from 
the UK?’, RUSI Journal, October 1996, p. 32. 
4
 Thompson, J. (1991) The Lifeblood of War – Logistics in Armed Conflict, London: Brassey's, p. xvi. 
5
 Ibid. p. 289. 
6
 Ibid. pp. 291-292. 
7
 Burgess, K. & Singh, P. (2006) 'A Proposed Integrated Framework for Analysing Supply Chains' in Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp. 337-344. 
8
 See for example Ellram, L. & Maltz, A. (1997) Outsourcing: Implications for Supply Management, Tempe, 
Arizona: Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies, April 1997. 
9
 Savas, E. (2000) Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, New Jersey: Chatham House Press; 
Domberger, S. & Rimmer, S. (1994) 'Competitive Contracting and Tendering in the Public Sector: A Survey' in 
the International Journal of the Economics of Business, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp. 439-453. 
10
 Vass, S. (2011) 'Warning PFI will be costing the Scots £1 billion a year' in The Herald, 02 October 2011, at 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/warning-pfi-will-be-costing-scots-1-billion-a-year-1.1127094 
as of 11 October 2011. 
11
 Jost, G., Dawson, M. & Shaw, D. (2005) 'Private Sector Consortia Working for a Public Sector Client – 
Factors That Build Successful Relationships: Lessons from the UK' in European Management Journal, Volume 
23, Issue 3, pp. 336–350. 
12
 Moore, D. M. & Antill, P. D. (2000) ‘Outsourcing the Defence Business – Improving Performance or 
Reducing Ability’, 9th International Annual IPSERA Conference Proceedings, 24 – 27 May 2000, Richard Ivey 
School of Business, University of Western Ontario, p. 539. 
13
 Uttley, M. (2004) 'Private Contractors on Deployed Operations: The United Kingdom Experience' in Defence 
Studies, Volume 4, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 145-165. 
14
 Fernyhough, A. (1980) A Short History of the RAOC, London: Europrint, p. 7;  
15
 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. (2009) At What Cost – Contingency 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report dated June 2009 and located at 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-10-09.pdf as of 12 October 
2011, p. 21. 
16
 Kinsey, C. (2009) Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 94-99. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 See The Local. 'Bundestag votes to broaden Afghan mission' at http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110325-
33969.html as of 12 October 2011. 
18
 Baum, J. & McGahan, A. (2009) Outsourcing War: The Evolution of the Private Military Industry after the 
Cold War, located at  http://www.business.illinois.edu/ba/seminars/2009/mcgahan_paper.pdf as of 13 October 
2011. 
19
 Op Cit. Uttley (2004). 
20
 Miller, T. (2010) 'Contractor Deaths Accelerating in Afghanistan as they Outnumber Soldiers', 14 April 2010, 
at http://www.propublica.org/article/contractor-deaths-accelerating-in-afghanistan-as-they-outnumber-soldiers 
as of 18 October 2011. 
21
 Higginson, A. (2010) 'Contractor Support to Operations – Proactive or Reactive Support?' in RUSI Defence 
Systems, Volume 13, No. 2 (October 2010), pp. 16-19. 
22
 Op Cit. Uttley (2004). 
23
 Haddon-Cave, C. (2009) An Independent Review into the Broader Issues Surrounding the Loss of RAF 
Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006, HC1025, 28 October 2009, located at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0809/hc10/1025/1025.pdf as of 17 October 2011. 
24
 Op Cit. Higginson (2010). 
25
 Trevor, Capt N. (2010) 'Reserve Post Operational Support: Placing the Reserve Soldier First' in British Army 
Review, No. 150, pp. 117-118. 
